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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
STEVE AMICONE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 10736

KENNECOTT COPPER
CORPORATION,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This action was brought against Kennecott Copper Corporation by Steve Amicone who was an employee for ove1· 28 years for disability benefits under
the Kennecott Copper Corporation Retirement Plan
f<ll' salaried employees.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried to a jury on Special Interrnga tories. The Court determined that the jury's answers thereto favored the defendant, Kennecott
Copper Corporation and directed the Entry of Judgment in its favor.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant Steve Amicone seeks a reversal of
the judgment in the Lower Court and judgment in
his favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a new
trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, Steve Amicone, had for many years
been employed by Kennecott Copper Corporation as
a manual laborer ( R. 62). He was first employed
by the defendant at age 18 in 1936 and had been continuously employed by the defendant (except for
U. S. Army Service during World War II) from 1936
until January 19, 1965, (Exhibit 3-p).
At the time plaintiff went to work for Kennecott Copper Corporation at the age of 18 he had 91/2
years schooling, approximately, and had had no
special job training ( R. 62).
His first job at Kennecott was on the track gang
and his duties were repairing and replacing tracks
and ties ( R. 63) . He worked in this department for
approximately 3 to 4 years. Early in 1941 he transferred to the job of machinist helper ( R. 64). His
duties in this job included oiling and cleaning machinery and bulldozers.
In December 1941 he was inducted into the
service and returned to civilian life in October, 1945
( R. 64) . He was again em ployed at Kennecott as a
machinist helper and performed much the same
duties as he had performed before he entered the

1nilita1·y service (R. 65). He remained on the job for
only about six months and then transferred to the
geographical department which is now known as
the Quality Control Department. His duties in this
job required him to work on the various levels at the
mine at Bingham Canyon and collect samples from
the drill holes for analysis at the assay office. His
job was to collect samples weighing approximately
1 pound and these would be placed in bags and labeled
and then from 25 to 50 samples would be tied in a
bundle and he would take these to the assay office
from the drill site (R. 65).
Sometime in 1957 or 1958 while walking down a
ramp from one level of the mine to another plaintiff
slipped on some ice, fell and injured his lower back
(R. 67 and 68). From that time on plaintiff had
trouble with his lower back and his physical ability
to do manual labor became progressively impaired
(R. 69).
In 1961 in order to avoid the walking and climbing necessary to his job of collecting ore samples
plaintiff secured a transfer to the Kennecott Research Center at the University of Utah. His duties
on this job required him to break down large ore
samples for analysis by the technical staff. The ore
is brought to the center by truck, loaded into bins.
They are then moved by for kl ift and crushed by
machinery. Samples were then mixed and shoveled
by plaintiff and other employees ( R. 69 & 70). Plaintiff continued on this job of manual labor of breaking
3

down and shoveling ore samples until January, 1966,
at which time he was discharged by defendant.
The blue slip, or separation notice, given to the
plaintiff by Kennecott shows: "Discharged because
of illness." (Ex. 3-P)
The plaintiff's physical history dates from the
accidental low back injury he suffered at the Bingham Canyon Mine in 1957 or 1958. He was first
treated by doctors Jenkins and Sorenson, who were
the company doctors at Bingham, Utah (R. 67). He
was hospitalized briefly in 1959 for therapy (R. 68),
then in June of 1963, Dr. Peter Lindstrom operated
on the plaintiff's back at the Salt Lake County Hospital and evidently removed a disc from the lower
lumbar area of the spine (R. 70); however, this
surgery did not improve the plaintiff's condition and
he continued to experience pain in his low back while
performing the duties associated with his job ( R. 71).
He was required to be on his feet all day and do
shoveling and this would produce pain in his low
back (R. 71). Eventually the pain became such that
he had to give up shoveling entirely and this portion
of his job was taken over by his fellow employees
(R.71).
After Dr. Lindstrom left this area for California
plaintiff transferred to Dr. Mark Greene, an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Greene gave him direct novocaine shots in the back and he was required to take
a prescription for pain killers (R. 71).

In April of 1964 the plaintiff was again hospitalized with arthritis and bursitis of the shoulder.
For several months prior to this hospitalization he
was given cortisone shots which did not help. His
shoulder and arm became "stiff and locked." During
the hospitalization in the Spring of 1964 he was put
under general anesthetic and the arm and shoulder
were manipulated in an attempt to restore motion to
the arm and shoulder ( R. 72) .
After hospitalization in the Spring of 1964 and a
period of recuperation Dr. Greene suggested that he
return to work but that he avoid any lifting or
shoveling ( R. 79). Plaintiff contacted his superiors
at the Research Center and was advised to have a
physical examination by Dr. E. B. Kuhe, the company
doctor, before he returned to work. He had the physical examination and again met with the superiors
at Kennecott sometime in December, 1964 (R. 82-84).
Plaintiff was informed that because of his physical
impairment that there was no job available for him
at the Research Center ( R. 87-88).
Later the plaintiff met with Mr. Flynn who is
the personnel director for the Kennecott Copper
Corporation, Western Division, concerning the possibility of his returning to some job with the company.
The result of this meeting was a letter from Mr. H.
H. Spedden (Exhibit 2-B) director of the Research
Cente1· which states:
"Dear Mr. Amicone:
This is to advise you that after consultation with Mr. E. J. Flynn, your termination
5

at the Kennecott Research Center was necessary because there are no jobs available which
you are physically able to fill and it is anticipated that no such jobs will be available in
the future.
Termination on this basis carries with it
the following consequences: Your group life
insurance, accidental death and dismemberment insurance, weekly accident and sickness
insurance and hospital, medical, surgical COY·
erage terminated on January 19, 1965, the
date of your discharge.
Very truly yours,
/s/ H. R. Spedden"
Plaintiff Steve Amicone was a salaried employee
of Kennecott Copper Corporation and had been continuously employed for at least a period of ten years
before his discharge. As such he was entitled to the
benefits of the "Kennecott Retirement Plan for
Salaried Employees." The sole question for determination before the Lower Court was whether the
plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled under
the terms of the plan. Medical evidence was, of course,
essential to a determination of this question and three
doctors testified regarding the physical condition of
the plaintiff.
Dr. E. B. Kuhe:

Dr. E. B. Kuhe testified on behalf of the plaintiff. He has practiced medicine in Salt Lake City,
Utah, for a number of years and is qualified as a
6

general surgeon. For twenty years he was an employee of Kennecott Copper Corporation and for the
last ten years has been retained by the company on
an annual retainer. He has no formal training in the
field of orthopedics and does no surgery in this field
(R. 96-97).
Dr. Kuhe first became acquainted with the
plaintiff in 1963 when the plaintiff transferred from
the mine to the research division. Plaintiff was given
a general physical examination at that time and Dr.
Kuhe obtained a history from him that indicated that
he had had a laminectomy by Dr. Lindstrom and that
he had had back trouble since the laminectomy and
that he had had a good deal of physical therapy ( R.
97-98).
Dr. Kuhe at that time diagnosed the plaintiff's
physical condition as chronic back trouble; that he
was unable to do his job in Bingham; and that he
had stiffness in his shoulders (R. 98). The x-rays
of the lower back of the plaintiff did not show laminectomy too well because possibly just a small "bite"
was taken off the lamina but the x-rays did show a
compression or narrowing of the intervertebral space
between the 5th lumbar and the 1st sacrum (R. 99).
In his notes Dr. Kube states: "Since (he) is an old
employee ( 27 years) I believe he should be given a
chance."
Dr. Kube next examined the plaintiff on or
about the 25th day of July, 1964. This was more
7

or less an oral examination. The plaintiff came to
him stating that he was supposed to go to work and
that he was under the care then of Dr. Greene and
could not go to work ( R. 100).
Dr. Kuhe next examined the plaintiff on or
about the 11th of November, 1964. He examined the
plaintiff at that time for spasm and for mobility of
the shoulder and back and re-x-rayed the plaintiff's
back. At that time the doctor found that the plaintiff
could move his right arm only to a horizontal position
whereas normal movement would be to a vertical
position. He also found that lateral movement of the
plaintiff's right arm was restricted; he could move
his arm behind him only to the crease on his trouser
whereas normal movement would be to touch the
spine. The doctor further found in bending that the
plaintiff had fair mobility of the back. He could bend
down to at least horizontal at which time he experienced a spasm or tightening in the lower lumbar
muscles. There were no changes in the x-rays from
his examination in 1963 (R. 101-102).
In the opinion of Dr. Kuhe the plaintiff would
never again be able to do "hard work-manual labor"
(R. 103).
He explained the when he used the term "hard
work and manual labor" he meant "heavy lifting;
shoveling; lifting weights greater than 20-25
pounds; twisting such as you would have to do when
you shovel," and that plaintiff would not be able to
stoop 01· bend for long periods ( R. 103).
8

D1·. Kuhe was further of the opinion that assum-

ing no medical intervention that the condition of the

plaintiff would be permanent (R. 104).

On cross-examination over plaintiff's objection
there was introduced in evidence a report signed by
Dr. Kuhe entitled "Kennecott Copper Corporation
Retirement Plan for Salaried Employees" (Exhibit
6-D). In that report the doctor states in substance
that plaintiff never will be able to do "hard, manual
labor" but that he could do clerical work, light bench
work, watchman, or guard. He concludes by stating
that in his opinion the plaintiff was not totally disabled so as to be prevented thereby from engaging
in any occupation or employment whatsoever for remuneration or profit.
(as will be noted in the argument below, the
legal effect of the term "totally disabled" so
as to be prevented thereby from engaging in
any occupation or employment whatsoever for
remuneration or profit is the crux of the case.)
On re-direct examination when queried as to the
meaning of the term "totally disabled," Dr. Kuhe
stated it meant to him that plaintiff could do no work
at all (R. 115).
DI'. Boyd G. Holbrook:
Dr. Holbrook had first seen the plaintiff in consultation with Dr. H. Jenkins in February 2, 1959.
His examination at that time revealed some evidence
1if muscle spasm and tenderness, a list or inability to
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stand completely straight. His x-rays were normal
and a myelogram showed no evidence of a ruptured
disc (R. 118-119).
Dr. Holbrook again examined the plaintiff on
March 11, 1966, at the instance and request of the
attorneys for Kennecott Copper Corporation. With·
out detailing the doctors testimony suffice it to say
that he found substantially the same physical condition as did Dr. Kuhe, to-wit: A long history of low
back trouble treated surgically without apparent relief; bone formation due to irritation; a wearing or
narrowing of the lumbral-sacral joint and a limita·
tion of motion of the right arm and shoulder ( R. 126·
127).
As far as the plaintiff's employability it was the
opinion of the doctor that he could carry out work
requiring a moderate type of activity not involving
excessive stooping, lifting, or twisting, but that he
would be unable to engage regularly in manual labor
(R.128).
On cross-examination the doctor stated that he
did not think that Mr. Amicone was totally and per·
manently disabled and that that term meant to him
that a person could not expect to be reasonably em·
playable on a constant or average labor market (R.
130).
Dr. Mark H.Greene:
Dr. Mark H. Greene, a qualified orthopedic
surgeon and plaintiff's treating physician, was called
10

as a witness by the defendant (R. 134). Plaintiff
became a patient of Dr. Greene on January 31, 1964.
At that time plaintiff was given an injection of
xylocaine and cortisone into the right shoulder to
alleviate pain and improve the range of motion. He
saw the plaintiff on several occasions after that.
There appeared to be no improvement and plaintiff
was hospitalized on April 22, 1964, for a manipulation of the right shoulder. Plaintiff had considerable
pain for some months thereafter and at the time
of the trial the doctor stated that there was still limited range of moti'on on internal rotation of the shoulder. The doctor testified that plaintiff had 25 degrees of normal rotation. He continued to treat the
plaintiff during 1964 and on November 10, 1964, he
examined him for the purpose of filing a report for
Kennecott Copper Corporation relative to retirement
(R.136).
The doctor on direct examination identified Exhibit 6-D which is a statement by him indicating that
the plaintiff was not totally disabled so as to be prevented thereby from engaging in any occupation or
employment whatsoever for remuneration or profit.
On Cross-examination the doctor testified that
he reviewed a chart that dated back to January 26,
1961, but that he saw him for the first time on January 31, 1964. Plaintiff had a history of low back
pain and a laminectomy operation. At that time Dr.
G1·eene was concerned only with the shoulder. Later
11

he diagnosed his low back problem as a degenerated
lumbar disc (R.141).

He stated further that the plaintiff needed an
operation for the removal of the disc and a fusion
and that this type of operation is a serious operation
and that there is danger attached to it; such as the
individual reaction to the surgery and possible damage to the spinal cord. He further testified that there
is not always a good union between vertebrae and
the fusion operation (R. 143).
The doctor testified further that the plaintiff
would not be able to do any occupation that required
heavy lifting or shoveling. He did state affirmatively
that the plaintiff could do the type of work which
did not require heavy lifting or twisting (R. 144).
The doctor did state that the plaintiff could exercise
providing he learn to take care of his back and that
bowling would be all right provided he would learn
how to deliver the ball correctly and stoop correctly.
He stated further that he would not advise the plaintiff to drive truck and indicated that he would not be :
able to have a job where he was sitting all the time
and that he could not handle a job where he was standing all the time unless he learned how to stand with
one foot off the ground periodically (R. 145).
The doctor stated in response to the question as
to what "totally and permanently disabled" meant to
him by stating that "what it actually means to me,
is, primarily, that a patient cannot work and perform his usual work." (R. 145-146)
1
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1:2

POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER
JCOG;\IENT FOR PLAINTIFF BASED ON THE ANSWERS
~JADE BY THE JURY TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORY
rERDICT.

The sole question below was whether plaintiff's
physical impairment entitled him to benefits under
the Kennecott Retirement Plan.
The contractual language of this plan is contained in Exhibit 1 Pat page 38 and reads:
RETIREMENT ON ACCOUNT OF PERMANENT AND TOTAL DISABILITY:
An Employee who is permanently and
totally disabled shall be retired from the service of the Employing Company provided (a)
he has completed ten ( 10) or more years of
Continuous Service to the date that his services
ceased; and (b) his permanent and total disability has been established in the opinion of a
qualified physician, designated by the Corporation. Such an Employee shall become a Pensioner as of the first day of the month following the completion of six ( 6) months of such
permanent and total disability, or, the date
that the existence of such permanent and total
disability was established, whichever is later.
An Emp.loyee who has become a Pensioner pursuant to this Subsection 3.2 shall remain a
Pensioner only so long as his permanent and
total disability shall continue. The Corporation shall have the right to verify the continued
existence of the Pensioner's permanent and
total disability at reasonable times from time
to time prior to his 65th birthday. Should
13

the Pensioner refuse to submit to medical examination, any pension allowance granted
under this subsection shall be discontinued
until the withdrawal of the refusal. The existence or non-existence of permanent and total
disability on and after such Pensioner's attainment of his 65th birthday shall not be a factor
in determining the Pensioner's rights under
the Plan.

"Permanent and Total Disability" for the ,
purposes of the Plan means disability by bodily
injury or disease which prevents the Employee
from engaging in any occupation or employment whatsoever for remuneration or profit,
and which disability, in the opinion of a qualified physician appointed by the Corporation,
will be permanent and continuous during the
remainder of the Employee's lifetime, and
which an appointee of the Corporation shall determine-

!

( i) was not contracted suffered or incurred while the employee was engaged in,
or did not result from his having engaged
in, a criminal enterprise; and,
(ii) did not result from his habitual
drunkenness or addiction to narcotics, or
self-inflicted injury; and
(iii) did not result from service in the
armed forces after July 1, 1951, and for
whic? the Employee receives a military
pens10n.

It is undisputed that plaintiff had worked continuously for Kennecott for the required ten years28 years in fact.
14

i

The precise legal question was whether the
plaintiff's disability was permanent and total as contemplated by the contract. The contract states that
"permanent and total disability" means "disability
by bodily injury or disease which prevents the employee from engaging in any occupation or employment whatsoever for remuneration or profit, and
which disability, in the opinion of a qualified physician appointed by the corporation, will be permanent
and continuous during the remainder of the employee's lifetime."
The foundation of a case such as this must of
necessity be medical testimony from those experts
who are familiar with the condition of the plaintiff.
Under the statement of facts in this case, the testimony of the three doctors concerning the plaintiff's
condition was set forth quite extensively. We think
it might reasonably be concluded from this testimony
that the plaintiff had lower back trouble with degenerated disc and a demonstrable limitation of motion in his right arm and shoulder.
Each doctor also testified as to the limitations
plaintiff was up against as far as working was con<:erned.
DI'. Kuhe:

"Never be able to do hard work labor."
15

manual

When asked what was meant by that the doctor
said:
"Heavy lifting; shoveling; lifting weighb
greater than 20-25 pounds; twisting such as
you would have to do when you shovel." (R.

115)

Dr. Holbrook:
"It was my opinion that, as far as this mans
employability was concerned, it would appear
that he should be able to carry out moderate
type activity that don't (doesn't) involve excessive stooping, lifting, or twisting."
The doctor also stated:
"It would be my opinion that he would be unable to engage, regularly, in manual labor."
Dr. Greene:
"Well, I would advise-and probably have advised Mr. Amicone-primarily, to do a type of
work which would not require heavy lifting,
which would be janitorial lifting and didn't
require using big buffing machines, things like
that; messenger type of work; painting would
not hurt him as long as he didn't have to do
any twisting, heavy lifting-all these things
you have to watch for all the time, primarily,
any type of occupation that does not require
heavy lifting and twisting."
Surprisingly the doctors varied in their judgment in some respects as to what the plaintiff could
do.
Dr. Kuhe:
"I think he could drive a pick up truck." (R.

114)

Dr. Greene:

"I would advise him not to drive a truck as
long as he doesn't have surgery and as long
as he still has trouble with his back." (R. 145)
The doctors also had differences in opinion as
to the term "permanent and total disability."
To Dr. Kuhe it meant:
"That he can do no work." (R. 115)
To Dr. Greene it meant:
"Well, that is a very good question; and what
it actually means to me, is primarily, that a
patient cannot work and perform his usual
work." (R. 146)
Dr. Holbrook stated:
"Well, I think, first, that we have to say what,
to me, this means. And, to me, this means that
a man cannot reasonably be expected to be
employable on a constant or average labor
market."
The only job the plaintiff ever had was with
Kennecott Copper Corporation and the only work
that he ever did for them involved manual labor only.
He first worked on the track gang many years ago
which is hard manual labor. He then transferred to
the machinists ghop which again is hard manual
labor; he then worked at the mine, bagging and
earrying samples from drill holes, which involved
weights of 25 to 50 pounds and the last job he had
at the time of his discharge was in the Bucking Room
at the Research Center and this involved breaking
clown large ore samples, mixing, shoveling, and pre17

paring them for analysis by the technical staff. This
also involved heavy manual labor.

The testimony of the plaintiff was that he could
no longer do the shoveling necessary to his job and
therefore he could not perform the duties that he was :
required to do . Kennecott evidently agreed because
on his blue slip they state that he was discharged on
account of illness and in the letter they wrote to him
they stated that there were no longer any jobs he
could fill because of his physical disability. The three ,
doctors agreed that the plaintiff could no longer perform manual labor meaning shoveling, twisting and
bending and this is precisely the only thing that the
plaintiff had ever done and this was the only job
training that he had ever had.
So far as the doctors were concerned in their
testimony the plaintiff would never be able to perform manual labor again and to that extent he was
permanently and totally disabled. Kennecott Copper
had no further use for him-they fired him when he
applied for disability benefits on account of illness.
If Kennecott with its vast array of jobs in the Salt
Lake Valley had no use for the plaintiff, is there an
employer in this area that would? We need only call
on the knowledge common to all of us that when a
man passes forty ( 40) and becomes disabled his
worth on the labor market is virtually nil.
Next, the legal consideration of the facts and
medical testimony of this case as they might match
18

up to the contractual provision of the Kennecott Disability Plan as correctly interpreted:
Kennecott uses this language: "Permanent and
total disability" "for the purpose of the plan means
disability by bodily injury or disease which prevents
the employee from engaging in any occupation or
employment whatsoever for remuneration or profit."
This language is not novel or unique but has been
used for many years in the insurance industry in
Health and Accident Insurance Plans. This almost
identical language has been interpreted by this Court
in the case of Colovos v. Home Life Insurance Comvrmy of New York, 28 Pacific 2d 607; 83, Utah 401.
This was an action by plaintiff to collect under a
health and accident policy. As in the case at bar,
the issue was whether plaintiff was totally disabled
within the meaning of the terms of the policy. The
background of the plaintiff showed that he possessed
little education, that he had worked during his early
years at the Mills in Magna, Utah, but that in recent
years he had devoted his time to farming and peddling produce; that it was necessary in his work to
carry packages, sacks and bags weighing from 50 to
120 pounds and that it was also necessary for him to
plow and dig. He testified that it was impossible
for him to do general farm work because both arms
were necessary in the prosecution of this work.
The evidence of his medical disability was entirely confined to his right arm and particularly the
19

elbow and wrist which were arthritic. There was a
difference of medical opinion as to the extent of this
disability. The medical evidence together with plaintiff's testimony as to his inability to do the work that
he normally did was submitted to the jury on a general verdict and the jury found in favor of the plaintiff.
The important question on Appeal was whether
the evidence was sufficient to show that plaintiff
was totally and permanently disabled under the
terms of the policy. The term of the policy which the
Court was called upon to interpret and construe was
this : "Disability shall be deemed to be total whenever the insured becomes wholly disabled by bodily
injury or disease so that he is prevent~d thereby from
engaging in any occupation and performing any work
for compensation or profit, ... "
The Court then held:
"In this matter the court is called upon to
construe the contract, particularly the scope
and meaning of the following lines set out in
the paragraph above quoted: '* * * Prevented
from engaging in any occupation and performing any work for compensation or profit.' It
is the opinion of this court that the terms used,
'engaging in any occupation and performing
any work for compensation or profit,' has a
well-defined meaning. It means ability to follow any recognized occupation, and to do substantially all the acts that are necessarily and
usually performed by one who follows that
occupation. It could not be said that a man
:20

could engage in an occupation if he were able
to do only one or two of the acts customarily
performed by one engaged in such an occupation. Furthermore, there is an element of
continuity in following an occupation; that is,
the ability to continuously perform substantially all of the ordinary acts which, in the
ordinary course of events, a man following
such an occupation is called upon to perform.
Furthermore, 'compensation or profit,' as used
in the paragraph quoted from the policy, is
qualified, and relates to the preceding words,
'engaging in any occupation and performing
any work,' and contemplates that the compensation or profit to be received from the occupation engaged in, or work done, shall, in a fair
sense, be remunerative, and not merely nominal, and in the case at bar a small farmer who
could not do substantially all the labor that
usually is necessary to be done, or a peddler
who cannot lift or handle the bags of produce
he is accustomed to peddle, could not conduct
his farming or his peddling for profit or compensation in a remunerative sense.
(Citing cases)
In this case it is the opinion of the court that
the foregoing is a proper construction of the
language of the contract between the parties,
and that the testimony above set forth in determining whether it is sufficient to show total
and permanent disability, should be considered
in view of the foregoing construction of the
contract or agreement. That being so, the
question to be determined is whether the plaintiff is so disabled that he is prevented from
engaging in any occupation and performing
any work of substantially the same kind and
21

nature as he was accustomed and able to perform prior to the time he became afflicted with
the disability herein set out.
From the testimony it is clear that the plaintiff is an uneducated man; that his only work
has been farm work and the peddling of farm
products, with a little work as a common laborer in the mills at Magna. The testimony is undisputed that he could not get work at Magna
and the mills because he could not pass the
physical examination required. There is considerable testimony in the record that a man
cannot plow and dig, and do general farm
work without the use of both of his hands; that
the defendant cannot lift sacks from 50 to 120
pounds; that he cannot drive a truck used in
peddling, although he has driven one occasionally since the alleged disability. In view of this
testimony, it became a question of fact for the
jury to deternine, under the instructions of the
court which substantially defined the terms of
the contract, as herein defined by this court,
whether or not the disability was total an<l
permanent.''
The Court went on to state that the evidence on
the question of disability was sufficient to go to the
jury and further held that this evidence was sufficient to uphold the verdict rendered in favor of the
plaintiff.
The parallel between the language of the insurance contract in the Colovos case, Supra, and the
language of the Kennecott Retirement Plan is apparent. There is no material distinction between
the two and, of course, the precedent of the interpre22
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tation rendered by this Court in the Colovos case,
Supra, is binding. Thus, what we are talking about
in the case at bar, is whether the disability of plaintiff was such that he could not now engage in his
normal occupation of that of manual labor for remuneration or profit.
•4ll three doctors who testified in the case said
that he could not do that type of work.

The next pertinent inquiry is what did the jury
do with this evidence?
The case was submitted to the jury on a Special
Verdict and the questions and answers thereto are
now quoted:
INSTRUCTION NO. 15
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES
We, the jury, find from a preponderance of the
evidence in this case the following answers to
the questions propounded to us:
1. Based upon the definition of permanent and total disability heretofore given
you in these Instructions, did plaintiff,
Steve Amicone, become totally and permanently disabled on or before the 19th
day of January, 1965?
Answer: Yes.
If you answered Question 1 "yes," then
answer Questions 2 and 3.
2. Has a qualified physician designated
by defendant, Kennecott Copper Corpora23

tion, established in his opinion that plaintiff's disability was total?
Answer:

No

3. Has a qualified physician appointed
by defendant, Kennecott Copper Corporation, expressed the opinion that such total
disability will be permanent and continuous during the remainder of plaintiff's
lifetime?
Answer: Yes
The foregoing answers agreed upon, signed and returned to court this 2nd day of
June, 1966.
/s/ C. W. Millard
Foreman
The jury found that the plaintiff was totally
and permanently disabled as that term was defined
for them. The term was defined in Instruction No.12
given by the Court. This instruction reads:
You are instructed that the term "permanent
and total disability'' has a specialized meaning
in the law. It does not mean that the employee
must be unable to do any work at all; nor does
it mean that the employee must be bedridden
and unable to care for himself . It means such
disability as would prevent the employeein this case, the plaintiff-fo1· the rest of his
lifetime, with any degree of success and within
the range of his reasonable capabilities, from
earning wages or p1·ofit in some occupation or
gainful pursuit.
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It is not sufficient for the plaintiff to have
proved by a preponderance of the evidence only
that he was physically unable to perform his
normal job with Kennecott.

This instruction is in accord with the interpretation set forth in the Colovas case. The jury found
total and permanent disability. And the jury found
that such total and permanent disability would continue during the remainder of plaintiff's lifetime
and that the examining doctor appointed by Kennecott had so found. The plaintiff was victorious. He
had won his lawsuit. These two findings were sufficient to support a verdict in his favor. The Lower
Court did not agree. It directed that judgment be
entered in favor of defendant. Its reasoning was
based entirely on the Answer to Interrogatory No. 2,
wherein the jury had stated in effect that the doctor
designated by Kennecott had not in his opinion stated
that plaintiff's disability was total. The physician
designated by Kennecott was Dr. Kuhe and an analysis of his testimony and report will show that this
answer to question No. 2 was not determinative of
this case and in fact the Interrogatory and Answer
were superflous in view of the other two Answers.
Dr. Kuhe in his report to Kennecott which was
introduced in evidence over the objection of plaintiff,
stated that plaintiff was not totally disabled so as to
be prevented thereby from engaging in any occupation or employment whatsoever for remuneration or
pl'ofit. In his own report, however Dr. Kuhe stated
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that plaintiff would never be able to do hard, manual
labor. (Exhibit 5 D)
Of course, the reason the doctor did not find that
the plaintiff could not engage in any occupation for
remuneration or profit is because to his mind the
term "totally disabled" meant that the man could
donoworkatall (R.115).
But, this was not the ultimate question in the
case, namely as to whether a man could do any work.
As correctly interpreted and defined by the Court in
its Instructions the question was whether a man
could perform substantially all of those tasks associated with the work that he ordinarily and customarily performed.
Inherent in a determination of this problem is
the man's work history, his education and his training. The only work that the plaintiff had ever done
was manual labor; he had no specialized job training;
and very little education. Plaintiff is totally and permanently disabled and the jury in its wisdom so
found. When Dr. Kuhe on Exhibit 5D answered question 3 to the effect that the plaintiff was not totally
disabled, he necessarily brought to the matter his
own interpretation of what those words meant and
to him it meant that a man could not work at all.
The Court in directing that judgment be entered
for the defendant, obviously adopted the Answer to
Interrogatory No. 2 and of necessity then disregard26

eel the Answer to Interrogatory No. 1 and thus stripped the jury of its Findings on the ultimate issue.
The argument appellant makes above is much
better stated by this Court in the Colovos Case,
Supra. We quote:
The record shows that the plaintiff visited
appellant's office in Salt Lake City and presented his claim. The appellant bases its claim
on the theory that the action was prematurely
brought upon the following questions and answers from a questionnaire submitted by the
appellant to Dr. LaBarge, who treated the
plaintiff in this case. The questions and answers relied upon are as follows:
"If the insured is now unable to perform his
regular duties, is he physically able to engage
in lighte1· work of some sort, such as light
clerical or shop work, light housework, light
outdoor work, chores, etc? If so explain.
Ans. :No other disability except involvement
of the right wrist.
Ques.: Does the disability completely prevent
the insured from doing work of any kind or in
engaging in any business or occupation?
Ans.: No."
After receiving this report, the appellant notified the plaintiff it would not allow his claim.
The plaintiff immediately thereafter brought
this action. We are of the opinion that this
objection is without merit. The plaintiff's
right of action cannot be limited by his physican's report, nor is he bound by his statements.
33 C. J. 19 ~ 666; Couch Encyc. of Insur. Law
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~ 2226; Southern Woodmen v. Davis, 124 Ark.
518, 187 S. W. 638; Carson v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 162 Minn. 458, 203 N.W. 209.
If a claimant is not bound by the statements
of his own doctor there is even less reason to suppose
that he would be bound by the statements of a doctor
employed by Kennecott.

The plaintiff won his lawsuit. The ultimate
question before the jury was whether he was totally
and permanently disabled and the jury found that he
was. The fact that Dr. Kuhe, who was the physician
appointed by Kennecott to examine the plaintiff on
his application for disability benefits, did not so state,
is not binding, and cannot have the effect of annihilating the favorable determination of the jury. In
this, the Lower Court committed reversible error and
appellant asks that the judgment be reversed and that
the Lower Court be directed to enter judgment in his
favor for the amounts due under the disability plan.
For comparable authority supporting the Colovos case, Supra, see Couch Cyclopedia of Insurance
Law, 2d Edition, Section 53 :364 wherein it is stated:
The ordinary rule applies with respect to disabilities that where issues of fact must be re·
solved on the basis of conflicting evidence or on
inferences to be drawn from the evidence the
question is one for resolution by the jury. B~
cause of the very nature of the situation, it is
generally a question for the jury to determine
whethe1· the insured is disabled, the natui·p
of the disability, when it commenced and its
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duration, and whether total and permanent
or otherwise. . .
The testimony of a medical expert is not
requisite in order to justify the submission of
disability issues to the jury.
See also Gibson vs. Equitable Life Assurance
Society, 84 Utah 452, 36 Pac. 2d 105; Miller
v. New York Life Insurance Company, 84
Utah 539, 37 Pac. 2d 547; Rawlston vs. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 90 Utah 496, 62
Pac. 2d 1119; Bucher vs. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 91 Utah 179, 63 Pac. 2d 604.
It is anticipated that in response to appellant's
argument under this point defendant will assert that
its Pension and Disability Plan was mere gratuity
on its part; that it did not constitute a part of the
Employment Contract with its employees and that
hence its determination as to whether an employee
is totally and permanently disabled is binding upon
the employee. It will go further and state that since
its doctor did not find total and permanent disability
that the jury has no right to find on that question
and that therefore an Answer in its favor to Interrogatory No. 2 ends the lawsuit.

The appellant argues to the contrary that the
Pension and Disability Plan is a part of Kennecott
Employment Contract with its employees. This Contract is subject to the interpretation of a Court or
jury just as any other Contract must bear that scrutiny. This Court so held in Schofield vs. Zions Co29

operative Mercantile Institution, 85 Utah 281, 39
Pac. 2d 342.
Since Kennecott chose to adopt language identical to that contained in insurance contracts covering
the same subject matter this Court's interpretation
in that regard is clearly applicable.
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POINT II.
THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES ARE INCONSISTENT AND A NEW TRIAL IS REQl'IRED.

Appellant has argued that judgment in his favor
is dictated by reason of the Finding of the jury. Without compromising his position in this regard and only
in the event the Court disagrees with that position,
he now asks that the Special Verdict of the jury be
examined in detail and this will show an irreconcilable and fatal inconsistency in the jury's Answers.
The Special Verdict has been set forth earlier
in this Brief and will not be repeated at this time.
Suffice it to say, the jury found:
1.

Plaintiff was totally disabled.

2.

That a doctor appointed by Kennecott did
not find total disability in his opinion.

3.

That he did find that such total disability
would be continuous throughout the plaintiff's lifetime.

We are now only concerned with the Answers to

2 and 3. Each refers to total disability. The jury

was asked whether a doctor appointed by Kennecott
found total disability and the jury answered "No."
'I'he jury was then asked whether the doctor expressed the opinion that such total disability would be
permanent and continuous and the jury answered
"yes." These answers are diametrically opposed.
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Where, as in this case, the thinking of the jmy
as expressed in their Answers to Interrogatories
lacks clarity and where there is a clear appearance of
inconsistency and indefiniteness a new trial is a neeessity. This Court so held in Eastern Utah Develop·
nient Company v. General Insurance Company of
America, 17 Utah, 2d 327, 411 Pac. 2d 132.
CONCLUSION
The question in this case is whether plaintiff is
permanently and totally disabled. More precisely is
plaintiff disabled to such an extent that he cannot,
within his capabilities, and with any degree of success pursue some occupation for profit or remuneration.
Plaintiff had little education and no job training.
He had worked all his life for defendant doing manual labor. All of the doctors agreed that plaintiff
could no longer do that type of work.
Defendant had no further use for plaintiff; it
discharged him because of illness and made it pointedly clear to him in a letter that because of his disa·
bility there was no job available to him at the Re·
search Center. But, they would not pension him.
They tell him through their doctor that he is not permanently and totally disabled. That he can get a job
elsewhere doing something. They would agree that he
cannot do manual labor, but, still they say "he can
get a job doing something." Obviously they harbor

'
,
,

,
'

the view that if a man can sell pencils on the street
C'.omer that he is not then totally and permanently
disabled. Is the disability pension plan which is part
of their Contract with their employees only for those
who are helpless and bedridden? Of course not.
The law does not interpret this term "total disability" in so narrow a manner, nor does the term
"total disability" admit of such mathematical certainty. Determinatian in this area must in a sense
be personal and subjective. The education, training
and work experience of the individual must be considered. These are matters for the jury.
The jury having before it the evidence of plaintiff's experience and the fact that he could no longer
do the manual labor that he had done all his life under
a correct legal definition given by the Court in its instructions, found that plaintiff was permanently
and totally disabled. This Finding based upon convincing evidence was sufficient to support a judgment for the plaintiff. The Court erroneously then
directed judgment be entered for defendant and obviously did so based upon Answers to Interrogatory
No. 2, wherein the jury found that Kennecott's doctor
did not find plaintiff "totally and permanently disabled." That, however, was the ultimate question in
the case for determination by the jury. The Court in
effect has taken this prerogative from the jury and
given it to Dr. Kuhe, defendant's doctor. Expert wit33

nesses can only assist a jury, they cannot decide tht
case for them.
Appellant, Steve Amicone, asks, on the basis of
the jury Finding, based on sufficient evidence, that
this Court reverse the Trial Court, and direct that
judgment be entered in his favor. If this Court cannot agree with that position then clearly a new trial
must be granted on the basis of inconsistent Answers to Interrogatories.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & GARRETT
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant
520 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

